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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON
FEDERAL CONTROL OF DRAFT PROTESTS
[I]t is fit to take some notice of those who say, that the free
expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that
the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair
discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing
where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be
offence to those whose opinions are attacked, I think experience
testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling
and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard,
and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he
shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty'
As this country's government has increased its war efforts in Vietnam
and, consequently, increased the monthly draft calls, protest against the
war has increased commensurably. Many of the anti-war groups that have
sprung up in the last few years have focused their protest activity on the
draft as a means of opposing war. 2 During the summer of 1967, there
were several moves of varying success to unite these various anti-war
and anti-draft groups in order to co-ordinate protest activity and thereby
make it more effective.3 The protest activity has ranged from dissemination of information about the draft law by church groups4 to actual interference with the business of induction centers by militant student groups.5
The federal government has been granted the power to raise and
support Armies, a grant6 which includes the power to establish conscription
as the means to that end.7 Further, it cannot be disputed that Congress
can punish those who interfere with this system of raising armies or
attempt to do so,8 not only in time of declared war, but also during the
1. In 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIc.HTS IN
THE UNITED STATEs 7, 9-10 (3d ed. 1967).

2. See Finman & Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and

the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 632, 656 (1966) ; TIME, Sept. 8,
1967, at 15.
3. The two primary "coalition" peace groups are Vietnam Summer, see N.Y.
Times, April 5, 1967, at 1, col. 1; id. April 24, 1967, at 14, col. 3, and the Spring

Mobilization
Committee,
id. Feb. 26, 1967, at 3, col. 5.
. 4. See N.Y.
Times, see
April 9, 1967, at 28, col.
1 (Vermont Council of Churches);

id. July 2, 1967, at 2, col. 5 (American Friends Service Committee).
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 1, 1967, at 5, col. 3 (sitting in the entrance to

an induction center) ; id. May 25, 1967, at 4, col. 4 (blocking bus carrying inductees).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
8. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; see Z. CHAVEt, FREE SPEEc
IN THE UNITED STATES

81 (1941).
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"cold war" which has necessitated the maintaining of the armies. 9 The
question that arises is: To what extent may protest against the war and
the draft be carried before it loses its protection as free speech and
becomes punishable as an interference with a governmental function?
This comment will seek to deal briefly with the history of government
prosecutions against those who have spoken out against the draft, describe
the wide variety of anti-draft activity in this country today, and seek to
distill from the first amendment a workable principle or test to be used
in drawing the line between that form of protest which is protected from
governmental censure and that which need not be tolerated. Finally, an
attempt will be made to draw that line.
I.

GOVERNMENT PROTECTION OF THE DRAFT SYSTEM

A.

The Espionage Act of 1917

During the First World War, federal prosecutions against those accused of interfering with the draft system were brought under the third
section of Title I of the Espionage Act of 1917, which read in relevant
part:
[W]hoever, when the United States is at war . . . shall wilfully
obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to
the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
than twenty years, or both. 10
This language was interpreted by Judge Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten" to proscribe direct incitements to violent resistance
by urging others, successfully or unsuccessfully, that it is their duty or
in their interest to resist the law.' 2 Therefore, he concluded that a magazine containing cartoons suggesting that "conscription is the destruction of
youth" and poems and texts praising two jailed advocators of draft resistance did not itself advocate resistance to the draft in violation of the Act.
Judge Hand was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
9. Cf. Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam by
an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950) ; Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d
596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950). In Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254
U.S. 325, 336 (1920), Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion, recognized that
Congress, which has power to raise an army and naval forces by conscription
when public safety demands, may, to avert a clear and present danger, prohibit
interference by persuasion with the process of either compulsory or voluntary
enlistment.
10. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a)
(1964). The current statutory language is substantially the same except that the
phrase "or attempts to do so" has been added. This section, though titled "Activities
affecting armed forces during war," has been temporarily extended by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2391 (1964) until 6 months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950. Proclamation 2914, 3 C.F.R. 19491953 Comp., at 99. This proclamation is still in effect and, therefore, § 2388 is likewise
in full force. The extension section, § 2391, further states that,
acts which would give rise to legal consequences and penalties under section 2388
when performed during a state of war shall give rise to the same legal conse-

quences and penalties when they are performed during the period above provided for.
11. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
12. Id. at 540; see Z. CHAVss, supra note 8, at 42.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
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The court held that the Act proscribed all utterances having the natural
and probable effect of encouraging resistance to the law and which are
18
made with the intent to so persuade.
The Espionage Act first came before the Supreme Court in 1919.
The case was the famous Schenck v. United States14 in which officers of
the Socialist Party were indicted for conspiracy to violate the Espionage
Act in that they mailed circulars to men "who had been called and accepted for military service."' 5 The circulars urged these men to assert
their right and duty to oppose the draft. A unanimous Court, in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes, held that, because the nation was
at war when the circulars were sent, this expression was not within the
protection of the first amendment.' 6 The Court further stated that,
"[i]f the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper) its tendency and the
intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying
that success alone warrants making the act a crime."
Congress may
prevent interference with the draft system. If words are used under such
circumstances that there is a "clear and present danger" that the effectiveness of the draft will be hindered, the words will not be protected. "It is a
u8
question of proximity and degree.'
Following the Schenck decision, several other Espionage Act cases
came before the Court, resulting in convictions that bear testimony to
the narrow role the Supreme Court gave to the first amendment at this
time. In Debs v. United States,'9 the Court unanimously affirmed Eugene
V. Debs' conviction under the Act. Debs, in a speech at a Socialist convention, had praised certain individuals who were jailed for resisting
the draft and causing insubordination in the armed services. He said:
"[Y]ou need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery
and cannon fodder. ' 20 Decided the same day, Frohwerk v. United States21
unanimously affirmed a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct recruiting
by preparing and publishing, in a German-American newspaper, twelve
articles which attacked United States participation in the war. Again
writing for the Court, Justice Holmes said:
[A] conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be criminal even if
no means were agreed upon specifically by which to accomplish the
13. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).
14. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
15. Id. at 49.
16. "We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying
all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights."
Id. at 52.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
20. Id. at 214. Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote for the Court, noted with approval that:
[T]he jury were most carefully instructed that they could not find the defendant
guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their
natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service,
&c., and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind.
Id. at 216.
Published
Villanova
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
21.by 249
U.S. University
204 (1919).
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intent. It is enough
if the parties agreed to set to work for that
22
common purpose.
In the lower federal courts during the First World War, it was not
uncommon for persons to be convicted under the Espionage Act for
publicly expressing their personal opinions about the war.2 3 For example,
in Wolf v. United States,2 4 the defendant's conviction was based on conversations he had with several persons in which he said, inter alia, " 'that
this war was an unjust war . . . that it was unjust . .. to send the boys
across the ocean to fight ... that the United States was entirely unjustified

in its entrance into the present war. .. . "23 While the Court of Appeals
reversed on other grounds, it reasoned that because enlistment was a
voluntary act, and because one who believed the war to be unjust would
not be disposed to enlist, any attempt to implant such anti-war ideas in the
mind of another was, therefore, an attempt to hinder the enlistment service.
The fact that it had not been alleged that any of those who heard the
defendant's statements were within enlistment age was held to be immaterial since the government need only prove that the statements were
given such wide publicity that they might reach men who might become
26

recruits.

During World War II, there were relatively few prosecutions for
obstructing the draft under the Espionage Act, and only one reached the
Supreme Court.2 1 In that case, the defendant had written three articles
in which he depicted the war as a betrayal of America, and denounced
the allies, Jews, and the President. He had mailed copies of the articles
to many prominent persons, including labor officials, bishops, military
officers, and newspapermen among others. The Government showed
that the articles were read by persons subject to the draft, but the Court,
in a five to four decision, held that the evidence was insufficient to show
the specific intent required by the Act. The statute speaks of "wilfull"
obstruction: "That word, when viewed in the context of a highly penal
statute restricting freedom of expression, must be taken to mean deliberately and with a specific purpose to do the acts proscribed by Congress. 28
The Court found no evidence tending to show that the defendant's
dominant purpose was to reach and to influence those subject to the draft,
and also noted that none of the circulars made any direct or affirmative
appeals to such persons to not comply with the draft. While the Court did
22. Id. at 209. Justice Holmes noted that there was no special effort made by the
"conspirators" to reach men who were subject to the draft, but sustained the conviction because the record did not show that the circulation did not reach such persons.
Id. at 208-09.
23. See Z. CHAFFE, supra note 8, ch. 2.
24. 259 F. 388 (8th Cir. 1919).
25. Id. at 390.
26. Id. at 392. The court further stated that the prosecution need not show that
the words were ever actually heard or read by anyone of enlistment age; accord,
Coldwell v. United States, 256 F. 805 (lst Cir. 1919).
27. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
28. Id. at 686.
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not reach the first amendment question, its construction of the Espionage
Act seems to come very close to the original interpretation given the Act
by Judge Learned Hand in the Masses case. 29 At the very least, Hartzel
casts some doubt upon the present validity of many of the earlier convictions under the Act.
Since World War II no cases have been found where the Espionage
Act has been used to prosecute draft protesters.30 But this is not to
say that those seeking to thwart the draft have not been prosecuted. Since
1940, the federal government has relied primarily on the statute discussed
in the next section in order to obtain such convictions.
B.

5
The Universal Military Training and Service Act '

The "Offenses and penalties" section of the current draft law
provides:
[A]ny person . . . who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another
to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces or any
of the requirements of this title . . . or of said rules, regulations,
or directions . . . or any person or persons who shall knowingly
hinder or interfere or attempt to do so in any way, by force or
violence or otherwise, with the administration of this title . . . or
who conspires to commit any one or more of such offenses, shall,
upon conviction . . . [receive a maximum fine of $10,000 or a term
of not more than five years, or both] .... 32
Although the language of this statute is rather sweeping, it has been used
in a limited way to date. Illustrative of the few cases that have been
brought for "counseling" evasion of the draft is Warren v. United States.3
In that case, the defendant, who did not believe in war, urged his 18
year old stepson not to register for the draft and suggested that he go
to Canada or Mexico instead. Although the defendant even offered to
29. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) ; see p. 348 supra.
30. 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSSN, supra note 1, at 83 n.1.
31. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-71 (1964). This law was passed in 1948 after the
expiration on March 31, 1947 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
32. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964). This section is a re-enactment of 54 Stat.
894, the "offenses and penalties" section of the 1940 draft law, and has been tightened
up by amendments since it was originally enacted in the 1940 Selective Service Act.
The language "to refuse or evade" was added to eliminate such holdings as that of
the Supreme Court in Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945), where the Court
said, in a 5-4 decision, that counseling "refusal" to comply with the act was not made
criminal by the act because it then said only counseling "evasion" was proscribed.
The language, "interfere . . . by force or violence or otherwise," was added perhaps
to prevent such holdings as in Bagley v. United States, 136 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1943),
where the court held that words unaccompanied by acts cannot constitute "force or
violence." The adding of this phrase "or otherwise" would seem to bring within the
purview of this act most of the protest activity previously prosecuted under the
Espionage Act. See p. 348 supra.
33. 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950). See also
Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), affd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950): Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937 (4th

Cir. 1943).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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provide funds for emigration, the stepson declined the offer and duly
registered. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in affirming the
conviction, and denying the first amendment defense, used language
very similar to the Espionage Act cases:
Congress has power to raise armies by conscription in time of
peace as well as in time of war....
Freedom of religion and freedom of speech, guaranteed by the
First Amendment, with respect to acts and utterances calculated to
interfere with the power of Congress to provide for the common
34
defense . . . are qualified freedoms.

The court also said that the act of counseling evasion of the draft was
made a primary offense by the statute; therefore, to constitute the offense
it was not necessary that the person counseled actually evade or refuse to
comply with the law.
The Espionage Act and the Selective Service Act were both used
during the Second World War to prosecute the leaders of a Negro group
which attempted to persuade Negroes not to fight the Japanese.38 The
defendants were, at various times, president of the Pacific Movement of
the Eastern World, Inc. which set up local branch organizations aimed
at organizing the Negro against the war and the draft. The organization
held meetings at which the defendants would promote the ideas that
Japan was the champion of the Negro, that colored soldiers of America
should not fight colored soldiers of other nations, and that Japan would
liberate the Negro when it conquered the United States. They were indicted for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by wilfully attempting
to cause insubordination in the armed forces and to obstruct the draft,
and for conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act. The court affirmed
the conviction as to the Espionage Act count, finding that the defendants'
utterances had a tendency, and were intended, to cause insubordination
and obstruction. After this finding the court deemed it unnecessary to pass
on the Selective Service Act conviction. 6
There seems to be little doubt that in the area of "expression" and
its impact on the draft system, the Espionage Act and the Selective Service
Act overlap. In dealing with either act the courts have cited the Schenck
case8 7 in support of the power of Congress to pass an act which infringes on
34. 177 F.2d at 599. The defendant also raised the issue of freedom of religion in
his defense. He claimed the right to counsel his step-son as to his religious conviction
against the war and the draft. The court denied any such right, saying that religious
beliefs do not justify violation of valid laws; that freedom to believe is absolute, but
freedom to act is not, citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) ; accord, Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943).
35. Butler v. United States, 138 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1943).
36. Id. at 981. An almost identical case is United States v. Gordon, 138 F.2d
174 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 798 (1943), involving the "Peace Move
ment of Ethiopia." There, no Selective Service Act violation was alleged.
37. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
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the right of expression. 38 In fact, the same test is used by the courts
under both acts to determine whether the printed or spoken words violate
the acts. The test, supposedly derived from Schenck, was whether the
words were of such a nature and were used in such circumstances that
they would have a tendency, or their "natural and probable effect" would
be, to cause the evil Congress sought to prevent.3 9
However, when we examine the circumstances under which the
government sought to bring suit for violation of the Espionage Act, as
compared to the circumstances which provoked prosecutions under the
Selective Service Act, a difference is noticeable. Since 1940, when both
acts became available to the government for use in prosecuting draft
interference, violations of the Espionage Act have been charged where
40
the printed or spoken words were aimed at a rather large audience.
Under the Selective Service Act, however, the prosecutions have been
aimed at individuals who advocate draft resistance to others individually
or to co-members of an organization. 41 This distinguishable use of the
statutes is perhaps appropriate in view of the difference in the scope of
the acts defined as criminal by the two statutes. In that the Espionage
Act speaks in terms of obstructing the recruiting and draft system, it
seems that it is more properly aimed at attempts to undermine public
support of and compliance with the draft in a more general way. On the
other hand, the "counsels evasion" section of the Universal Military Training Act seems aimed particularly at outlawing private counseling situations. It is that same section of the Training Act which punishes any
knowing hindrance or interference "by force or violence or otherwise"
of the administration of the draft law which appears to be applicable
to the conduct prosecuted in the past under each statute. 42 Thus it appears
38. Compare Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd per
curiam, 340 U.S. 857 (1950), with Wolf v. United States, 259 F. 388, 391 (8th
Cir. 1919).
39. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) ("natural and intended
effect"); Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949) ("tendency");
Butler v. United States, 138 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1943) ("tendency") ; Baxley v.
United States, 134 F.2d 937, 939 (4th Cir. 1943) ("normal and natural consequence") ;
Wolf v. United States, 259 F. 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1919) ("tendency") ; Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917) ("natural and reasonable effect").
But see Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 687 (1944) (clear and present
danger) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (clear and present danger) ;
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (direct advocacy of
resistance) ; Z. CHAVgE, supra note 8, at 23-27, 50.
40. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944) ; Butler v. United States, 138
F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Gordon, 138 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 798 (1943) ; United States v. Pelley, 132 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764 (1943). All of these prosecutions also contained a
count in the indictment charging an attempt to cause insubordination in the armed
services, another offense contained in this section of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a)
(1964) ; cf. United States v. Powell, 156 F. Supp. 526 (N.D. Cal. 1957), mistrial
declared, 171 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1959). This appears to be the last prosecution
under this Act.
41. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945) ; United States v. Miller, 233
F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Okamoto v. United States, 152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945)
cases cited note 33 supra.
42. While 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964), § 12 (a) of the Universal Military
Training
and Service
Act ofCharles
1948, Widger
says "counsels,
aids,Digital
or abets
another"
Published
by Villanova
University
School of Law
Repository,
1968there is no
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that together the two statutes more than cover the field of all possible
kinds and degrees of hindrances of the selective service system.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT -

WHAT DOES IT PROTECT?

In the event of federal prosecutions, the question will be what kinds of
expression can the government suppress pursuant to its proper function
of raising armies and providing for the common defense. The primary
consideration in such cases will be the extent to which the first amendment protects individual freedom of speech against improper governmental
sanctions. 48 In the past, the outer limits of the first amendment were
drawn in terms of "clear and present danger." But the scope of the first
amendment has expanded immeasurably in the past two decades. Today
there is uncertainty not only as to what the "danger" test means, but
also as to what is the proper test to be applied when laws restricting
4
speech are evaluated.
Following Dennis v. United States,4 5 considerable doubt was raised
as to the continuing vitality of the "clear and present danger" test, which
traditionally had been used in cases involving free speech and interference with the draft.4 6

However, when Dennis and Yates v. United

States, 47 which "clarified" Dennis, are examined it can be seen that these
cases modified the "clear and present danger" test for certain situations
only. In Dennis, the leaders of the Communist Party were charged with
conspiracy to teach or advocate the overthrow of the government by force
or violence in violation of the Smith Act.48 Writing the opinion of the
Court, Chief Justice Vinson noted that because the defendants were convicted for "advocating" and "teaching," special attention must be paid
to the first amendment's "demands." 49 After analyzing the cases that gave
birth to the "danger" test, he concluded:
The rule we deduce from these cases is that where an offense is
specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction
case law to the effect that the statute applies only where there is counseling on an
individual basis. In any event, the "knowingly hinder or interfere . . . by force or
violence or otherwise" language of this same section contains no such restrictive
implications. See note 32 supra.
43. R. CUSHMAN,

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THS UNITED STATES 2 (1956);

Finman

& Macaulay, supra note 2, at 678-79.
44. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 912 (1963); Finman & Macaulay, supra note 2, at 679n.390; Meiklejohn, Public
Speech and the First Amendment, 55 Gno. L.J. 234, 245 (1966).
45. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
46. E.g., Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944); Taylor v. Mississippi,
319 U.S. 583 (1943) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Gara v. United
States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 340 U.S. 857 (1950) ; Butler v.
United States, 138 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937
(4th Cir. 1943).
For an extensive bibliography with regard to the development of the "clear
and present danger" test to 1950 and the impact of the Dennis case on the test, see
T. EMERsoN, D. HABUR & N. DORSeN, supra note 1 at 101, 126n.l.
47. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

48. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).

49. 341 U.S. at 502-03.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
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relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only when the speech or publication created a "clear and present
danger" of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime, e.g.,
interference with enlistment. 50
Thus he concluded that this case clearly called for the application of that
doctrine. But the Court was unwilling to apply the test as originally interpreted up to that time to the unique circumstances of the case before it.
[N]either Justice Holmes nor Justice Brandeis ever envisioned that
a shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a rigid rule to be
applied inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of each
case ....
.. .They were not confronted with any situation comparable
to the instant one - the development of an apparatus designed and
dedicated to the overthrow
of the Government, in the context of world
5
crisis after crisis. '
Application of the traditional test - that one may not be restricted from
advocating whatever he will until there is a clear and present danger that
a substantive evil will result therefrom - under the circumstances present
in Dennis would have meant that the Government could not act until an
actual attempt at overthrow was imminent. Therefore, the Court adopted
the modified test which Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit
had employed in affirming the conviction below - "whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' [that is, overthrow of the Government] discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. '' 52 The Court then concluded as a matter of law that
the danger of an attempted overthrow was sufficiently probable to warrant the application of the statute, and affirmed the convictions.
In Yates v. United States,5s Mr. Justice Harlan said:
The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrinationof a group
in preparation for future violent action, as well as exhortation to
immediate action, by advocacy found to be directed to "action for the
accomplishment" of forcible overthrow, to violence as "a rule of principle of action," and employing "language of incitement," . .. is not
constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size and
cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances
are such as reasonably to justify apprehension that action will
54
occur.
50. Id. at 505.
51. Id. at 508, 510.
52. Id. at 510. The Chief Justice reasoned that the "imminency of the danger"
requirement of the "clear and present danger" rule could not apply in cases where
the interest at stake is democracy itself. Hence it may be concluded that the "imminency" requirement still applies in cases where the interests at stake are not so great.
See M. SHAPIRO, FR"EDom o SPEECH: THE SUPRAME COURT AND JUDICIAL REvIEw
66 (1966).
53. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
54. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
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The Court and Congress were primarily concerned with inhibiting the
growth of an effective subversive organization, and the Court adopted
a first amendment test specifically for that purpose. Since Dennis, the
Court has fully realized this and has held that first amendment rights
can not be so restricted or invaded by the legislature except when dealing
with subversive groups.5 5 Therefore, because in draft interference cases
the gravity of the evil is substantially less than a violent coup d'etat,
and because the Communist Party is probably only incidently involved in
the anti-draft movement, the Dennis-Yates modification of the range of
expression traditionally protected by the first amendment becomes inapposite to a consideration of the meaning of the "clear and present danger"
test in this context.
Since the decision in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,56
a new approach to first amendment cases has come to the fore. This is the
"balancing" test, according to which the problem is viewed as one of
weighing the probable effects the statute will have upon the exercise of
free speech against the interests of society that are sought to be protected
by the legislature. 57 At the foundation of this test is the idea that while
beliefs are inviolate, conduct may be regulated for the protection and
ordering of society. And, in that speech is a form of conduct, it too may
be regulated in its manner and place when the regulation results only in
an "indirect, conditional, partial abridgment...
-58 This reasoning
has been extended to support decisions upholding state compelled disclosure of membership in the Communist Party or other allegedly subversive associations.5 9 Thus, the balancing test will be used where the
55. In Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959) the Court said:
That Congress has wide power to legislate in the field of Communist activity
in this Country .. .is hardly debatable .... In the last analysis this power rests
on the right of self-preservation, "the ultimate value of any society," Dennis v.
United States...
On these premises, this Court in its constitutional adjudications has consistently refused to view the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, and has
upheld federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem which in a different
context would certainly have raised constitutional issues of the gravest character.
See id. at 147-53 (Black, J. dissenting) ; Gibson v. Florida, 372 U.S. 539, 547, 549,
557-58 (1963) ; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
88-105 (1961).
56. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). In Douds, the constitutionality of the non-Communist
affidavit provision of the Taft-Hartley Act was unsuccessfully attacked as deterring
free speech.
57. Id. at 400.
58. Id. at 399. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (picketing near
a courthouse) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ("loud and raucous" sound
trucks) ; United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (political activity by
government employees) ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (unauthorized

parades).
59. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)

In re Anastapalo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961)
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365
U.S. 399 (1961) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
In Konigsberg, supra at 50-51, Mr. Justice Harlan formulated the test thusly:
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to
pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental
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statute does not, as applied, directly prohibit speech because of its content. 60 But, where the prohibition is directly on the substance of the
speech, and not on its form, it appears that the "clear and present danger"
test will be applied. This holds true whether the statute makes an act
unlawful and the evidence of the proscribed act in the particular case is
speech, or the statute makes speech itself the crime. 6 ' In either case, the
result is the same: the prohibition falls on the content of the speech. In
any prosecutions for obstructing the draft by printed or spoken words
under the Espionage Act, where the statute speaks in terms of conduct,6 2
or under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which outlaws
a particular kind of speech,6 3 the Government would be seeking to convict
for what was said, as well as where and when it was said.6 4 Therefore,
application of the "balancing" test would be improper in such cases.6 5
Proceeding from the premise that "clear and present danger" is the
proper test in any case involving speech that is alleged to obstruct the draft
or counsel evasion of it, the inquiry is then: What does the phrase mean?
When applied to such cases in the past, not infrequently persons were convicted because of the "tendency" of their words to produce the evil to be
prevented.66 This "tendency test" was adopted by the Supreme Court
while the first amendment was in its infancy. It was applied in Gitlow v.
68
New York 67 and Whitney v. California
over the protests of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis who urged that a "tendency" was not a sufficient
reason to abridge expression.6 9 However, as Mr. Justice Vinson indicated
in Dennis v. United States, 70 the Court subsequently has not followed
Gitlow and Whitney, but has "inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis
rationale."' Nevertheless, the lower federal courts, even when purporting
to apply the "clear and present danger" test, continued to convict for words
72
whose tendency might induce someone to unlawful action.
interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a
weighing of the governmental interest involved.
60. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1965).
61. Dennis v.United States, 341 U.S. 494, 506-08 (1951).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1964) : "Whoever .. .willfully obstructs the recruiting
or enlistment service of the United States .. "
63. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964): "[A]ny person . . . who knowingly
counsels ... another to refuse or evade registration or service ... "
64. E.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) ; Warren v. United States,
177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949).
65. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), the Court pointed out that
when first amendment liberties are involved, "it is the character of the right, not of
the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice ... "
66. Z. CHAEMZ, supra note 8, at 51; Emerson, supra note 44, at 909-10, 936n.71.
See, e.g., Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 340
U.S. 857 (1950) ; Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943).
67. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
68. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
69. Referring to the Gitlow case, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "But the prevailing
notion of free speech seems to be that you may say what you choose if you don't
shock me." 2 HOLMSs-POLLOCK LETTERS 163 (M. Howe ed. 1961).
70. 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
71. Id. at 507 and cases there cited.
72. Cases cited note 39 supra.
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There have been no prosecutions for obstructing the draft or counseling evasion of it for over 10 years. Yet in that time, the Court has used
the "clear and present danger" test in such a manner in related first
amendment areas so as to indicate that any such "tendency" test would
be inconsistent with today's concept of "first amendment protected
expression."
In the past two decades, the role of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine has been restricted to contempt cases involving statements thought
to obstruct justice and to criminal libel cases. In Wood v. Georgia,73
a sheriff accused local judges who had initiated a grand jury investigation
of Negro bloc voting habits of political intimidation and persecution of
the voters. He was cited for contempt of court on the grounds that his
statements were calculated to obstruct the grand jury investigation and,
therefore, constituted a clear and present and imminent danger to the
administration of justice. The Supreme Court rejected the finding of a
clear and present danger, holding that the clear and present danger
standard, quoting Bridges v. California,74 was "a working principle that
the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. ' 75
This is an affirmation of the "clear and present danger" doctrine in
the form espoused by Holmes and Brandeis in the Whitney and Gitlow
cases.7 6 In Bridges, the Court held that, in "'clear and present danger'
cases, neither 'inherent tendency' nor 'reasonable tendency' is enough to
justify a restriction of free expression. '77 However, in Cox v. Louisiana,78
the defendants were convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting
picketing "near" a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice. The
Supreme Court, in upholding the conviction, rejected the "clear and present danger" test as applied in Bridges and distinguished that case on the
ground that conduct intertwined with speech was not speech in its "pristine
form," and therefore was not entitled to the same protection under the
first amendment. The Court indicated that, assuming the applicability
of the "clear and present danger" test, the conclusion that such a danger
did exist under the circumstances would have been proper.7 9 The Cox case
may prompt the conclusions that, in the area of "obstruction of justice,"
the "clear and present danger" rule will be restricted in its use to cases involving only expression by words not intertwined with conduct, and
that when it is applicable, the "danger" test will be used primarily to
73. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
74. 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
75. 370 U.S. at 384.
76. See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73
(1925) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919); Mr. Justice
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
77. 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941) ; accord, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)
cf. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347-49 (1946).
78. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
79. Id. at 566.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8

12

Moss: The Effect of the First Amendment on Federal Control of Draft Pro
WINTER

1968]

COMMENTS

strike down infringements on speech.80 The Cox case can also be seen as
an application of the general rule that a state may regulate conduct if the
regulation is related to a public interest and does not amount to a restriction on the content of the expression. 8 l
In Ashton v. Kentucky, 82 the defendant was convicted for common
law criminal libel, defined by the trial court as any writing calculated to
create a disturbance or to lead to any indictable act. The Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the crime was unconstitutionally vague and, as
applied, it resulted in an infringement on the right of free speech. In arriving at this result the Court quoted such "clear and present danger" cases
as Cantwell v. Connecticut83 and Terminiello v. Chicago,8 4 and concluded
with the statement that: "[w]hen First Amendment rights are involved,
we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that
is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press
85
suffer."
The last Supreme Court decision dealing with the Universal Military
Training and Service Act was Bond v. Floyd.86 In that case, the Georgia
House of Representatives denied a newly elected Negro representative a
seat in the House on the ground, among others, that he had violated section
12 of the Military Training and Service Act, in that he had counseled,
aided, or abetted others to refuse or evade the draft.8 7 The basis for the
charge was that Bond had publicly endorsed a statement issued by the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in which the Committee voiced its "sympathy" and "support" for all who "are unwilling
to respond to a military draft." Bond further stated that, as a pacifist,
he was anxious to encourage people not to participate in war "for any
reason that they choose," but that he did not advocate that people could
break laws. In commenting on this charge, the Court said that Bond
could not have been constitutionally convicted under the Act, because the
80. In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), the conviction for breach
of the peace of demonstrators who massed at the State House was reversed by the
Supreme Court as unconstitutionally infringing their rights of free speech and assembly.
The Court did not mention the "clear and present danger" test specifically, but the
opinion of the Court concluded (at 237-38) with a long quote from Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948) which rested on the danger test. See Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 546 (1965).
81. See p. 356 supra; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
82. 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
83. 310 U.S.296 (1940).
84. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
85. 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966); accord, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269 (1964). Even more recently, in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18
(1966), the Court struck down a state statute which required state employees to take
a loyalty oath and criminally punished anyone who took the oath and then became or
remained a member of the Communist Party. Condemning the statute as too broad,
the Court said:
A statute touching those protected [first amendment] rights must be "narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present
danger to a substantial interest of the State." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311.
86. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964).
Published87.
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SNCC statement was not, under any interpretation, "a call to unlawful
refusal to be drafted,"88 and Bond's statements did not "demonstrate any
incitement to violation of law ....
See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia ...
v. United States . . . Terminiello v. Chicago....

Yates

In the last case to deal with a prosecution for interference with the
draft under the Espionage Act of 1917,90 Hartzel v. United States,91 the
Court said that it was clear that one element necessary to constitute an
offense under the statute was "an objective one, consisting of a clear and
present danger that the activities in question will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent." 92 A year earlier, in
9
Taylor v. Mississippi,
" the Court had dealt with a conviction under a state
statute prohibiting the teaching of matter designed and calculated to encourage disloyalty to the United States and state governments. The defendants had stated that it was wrong to send boys to war, that it was
wrong to fight, and that American boys were being shot for no purpose.
The Court reversed the conviction on this charge, holding: "[W]hat they
communicated is not claimed or shown to have . . . advocated or incited

subversive action . .. or to have threatened any clear and present danger
to our institutions or our Government. What these appellants communicated were their beliefs and opinions....
In other first amendment areas, even when not applying a "clear and
present danger" test, the Court has stressed the need to find an "incitement" of action and an "imminent" danger of unlawful conduct in order
to uphold restrictions on expression. In Kingsley Picture Corp. v. Regents,95 a New York court denied a license to show a motion picture because it presented adultery as being right and desirable under certain
circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
Advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not, as Mr. Justice
Brandeis long ago pointed out, "a justification for denying free speech
where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to
indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on." Whitney

v. California,274 U.S. 357, at 376 (concurring opinion).98

This Whitney language was also substantially adopted by Chief Justice

Vinson in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,97 where he said,
88. 385 U.S. at 133.

89. 385 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added). It is most indicative of the present Court's

attitude toward draft interference prosecutions that it cited two cases grounded on
the "clear and present danger" test, Wood and Ternminiello. Yates taught that the
Smith Act can proscribe "advocacy which incites to illegal action," 354 U.S. 298,
313 (1957), and no less, if it is to stay within the bounds of the first amendment.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1964).
91. 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
92. Id. at 687.
93. 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
94. Id. at 589-90 (emphasis added). Compare this analysis with the positions
taken in Wolf v. United States, 259 F. 388 (8th Cir. 1919), and Coldwell v. United
States, 256 F. 805 (1st Cir. 1919).
95. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
96. Id. at 689.
97. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
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after discussing Whitney and Bridges, that "it follows therefrom that
even harmful conduct cannot justify restrictions upon speech unless substantial interests of society are at stake." 98
In Ashton v. Kentucky,9 9 the Court cited Cantwell v. Connecticut,'"0
which declared incitements to be outside the protection of the first amendment, and De Jonge v. Oregon,101 in which the Court said:
These [first amendment] rights may be abused by using speech
or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime ...
But the legislative intervention
can find constitutional justification only
02
by dealing with the abuse.'
The point is that when free speech is involved, that which advocates
unlawful action, and yet falls short of "incitement" to unlawful conduct,
is protected. 0 3 The late Professor Meiklejohn defined "incitement" as
"an utterance so related to a specific overt act that it may be regarded and
treated as a part of the doing of the act itself, if the act is done. Its
u0 4
control, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the legislature.'
Society may legitimately be concerned about illegal actions and incitements
to such action. But, as expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes, "Every idea is
an incitement."' 105 Therefore, "incitement" must be defined very close
to action in order to protect the expression of beliefs, opinions, and the
"robust advocacy" necessary to a functioning democracy. 0 6 This was, in
the Holmes-Brandeisian sense, the function of the "clear and present
danger" test. 10 7 The line over which expression may not pass without losing
its protection must be drawn with reference to the danger created at the
time of the expression. As Mr. Justice Rutledge said:
In the abstract the problem could be solved in various ways. At
one extreme it could be said that society can best protect itself by
prohibiting only the substantive evil and relying on a completely free
interchange of ideas as the best safeguard against demoralizing propaganda. Or we might permit advocacy of lawbreaking, but only so
long as the advocacy falls short of incitement. But the other extreme
position, that the state may prevent any conduct which induces people
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 397.
384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966). See p. 359 supra.
310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Id. at 364-65.
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 23, 35, 47 (1954); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 122 (1965).
104. A. MEIKLEJOH1N, supra note 103, at 123.
105. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
106. The line between expression which is protected by the first amendment and
that which is not is, necessarily, very narrow. Professor Meiklejohn drew the line
in terms of "advocacy of action" and "incitement of action," the latter not being
protected. A. MErKLEJOHN, supra note 103, at 122. Professor Emerson, on the other
hand, draws the line in terms of "expression" as opposed to "action." Speech "inseparably locked with action," he contends, should be treated as "action." Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 931, 932 (1963).
Martin Shapiro, in FREEDOM OV SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REvIEw
71, 118 (1966), speaks in terms of the distinction between "thought" and "action."
107. Z. CHAVEE, supra note 103, at 82; Mendleson, Clear and Present Danger From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 313, 315 (1952).
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to violate the law, or any advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be
squared with the First Amendment. 0 8
Speech which advocates unlawful action may not be infringed until
it comes very close to causing that unlawful conduct. Therefore, one cannot be convicted of obstructing the draft by words, or of attempting to
do so, unless the words would clearly incite an obstruction. And one may
not be convicted of counseling evasion of the draft until his advocacy
of such illegal conduct amounts to an incitement of it.
III.

THE DRAFT PROTESTERS 10 9

The year 1967 witnessed perhaps the widest variety of anti-draft
activity in over a decade. The draft has become a prime target for the
growing number of those who dissent from our government's Vietnam
policies, regardless of whether their motives for opposing the war are
political, moral, or racial. For example, draft counseling and resistance
centers have been organized throughout the country."10 The Vermont
Council of Churches and the American Friends Service Committee, a
Quaker organization, offer counseling services aimed at helping conscientious objectors to avoid participation in the war, and inform those subject
to the draft of their legal rights under the laws."' The militant student
organization, Students for a Democratic Society, and the Congress of
Racial Equality operate "draft resistance unions" and "workshops."" '
Mass demonstrations at draft boards and induction centers are perhaps the most widespread forms of protest. Techniques range from silent
picketing with signs such as "Don't Kill - Don't Die - Don't Go," to
aggressive acts of civil disobedience, such as blocking the doors of buildings and obstructing the movement of busloads of inductees."13 Generally
such disruptions result in arrests on charges of disorderly conduct and
trespassing, but recently, seven members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee who picketed an induction center were reportedly
indicted by federal authorities "for interfering with administration of the
Military Training and Service Act."" 4
In seeking to "escalate opposition to the war,"" 5 nationally known
figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King have publicly urged "avoidance
108. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 102 (1947) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes
omitted).
109. See generally Finman & Macaulay, supra note 2, at 641-61. This section of
the comment will attempt to present but a sampling of the most recent varieties of
protest in order to highlight and give background to the free speech and governmental

self protection problems discussed later.
110. TiMe, Sept. 8, 1967, at 15. It is estimated in this report that the total number
of draft counseling centers is now over 100.
111. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1967, at 2, col. 5; id. April 9, 1967, at 28, col. 1; id.
March 26, 1967, at 20, col. 1.
112. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1967, at 25, col. 4; id. May 7, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
113. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1967, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.) ; id. Aug. 18, 1967,
at 12, col. 7; id. Aug. 1, 1967, at 3, col. 7; id. May 25, 1967, at 4, co1 . 4; id. April 1,
1967, at 5, col. 3.
114. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1967, at 16, col. 3.
115. Id. April 24, 1967, at 14, col. 3.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
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of military service for those who are against the war," encouraging
them to seek conscientious objector status.116 The more militant "Black
Power" spokesmen, however, such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown,
and Floyd McKissick, have openly urged Negroes to resist the draft by
any means.1 7 In California, a group of pacifists have formed the Committee for Draft Resistance. They have announced that they intend to
"explicitly encourage, aid and abet ... civil disobedience . . ." of the draft
law, even though it may result in fines or imprisonment."'
Perhaps the most extreme form of anti-draft activity, and that which
is clearly illegal, is the operating or aiding an "underground railroad" by
which draft evaders might emigrate across our borders or disappear into
the slums of our nation's big cities. A few student groups have openly
declared their intention to assist those seeking refuge from the draft in
Canada." 9 While it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell how serious a
threat to the draft system such activity may pose, or even if organized
underground railroads do exist, it has been estimated that presently there
1 20
are about 1500 American "draft dodgers" in Canada.
Generally speaking, it has been reported that draft dodging convictions,
draft delinquencies, and applications for conscientious objector status
have increased during 1967, but that they are still below Korean and
Second World War levels. 121 Whether this increase is simply due to
the increased war activity and draft calls, or to the activity of draft
resistance groups, is certainly debatable. Apparently, the federal authorities have not felt that the anti-draft activity to date presents a substantial
threat to the draft system, 22 but if the war continues, anti-draft activity
will surely increase. As the draft protest increases it is becoming apparent
that its form will change from simple dissent to aggressive civil disobedience. 128 Under such circumstances, the possibility of federal prosecutions
124
will be more likely, if not already a fact.
116. Id. April 5,1967, at 1, col. 2.
117. Id. June 28, 1967, at 2, col. 7; id. May 1, 1967, at 1, col. 7; id. April 16, 1967,
§ 4, at 3, col. 3. The position on the draft adopted by the First National Conference
on Black Power was stated simply as "Hell, no, we won't go." Id. July 24, 1967,
at 16, col. 2.
118. Id. July 18, 1967, at 27, col. 3.
119. Id. May 7, 1967, at 1, col. 3 (Students for a Democratic Society) ; id. April
9, 1967, at 22, col. 1 (a student faction of the American Friends Service Committee)
see TImE, supra note 110.

120. 0. Clausen, Boys Without a Country, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 25. Canada will not extradite anyone merely for draft dodging. Id.
121. U.S. Nnws & WORLD REPORT, May 22, 1967, at 14.
122. Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, head of the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, stated before the House Armed Services Committee on May 5,
1967, that draft law violation problems had not increased appreciably in the last decade
and that no one had been prosecuted for helping others avoid the, draft "because the
Department felt no one has violated the law." N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
123. E.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1967, at 1, col. 2, (city ed.) ; id. at 9, col. 1; id.
Oct. 17, 1967, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.) ; id. Aug. 18, 1967, at 12, col. 7.
124. On June 8, 1967, the federal authorities reportedly indicted two men on
charges of attempting to thwart the draft law. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1967, at 89, col. 4;
see p. 362 supra.
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DRAFT PROTEST AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

At the outset, it can be safely posited that conduct which does, in
fact, obstruct, interfere, or hinder the functioning of the draft process may
be punished under the law 12 5 without invoking any serious first amendment questions. Such conduct would include disruptions of Selective
Service offices and induction centers by means of mass sit-ins and demonstrations which interrupt the business routine of those places. This is
"conduct," not "expression" in its true meaning, and conduct may
be
regulated in the interest of peace and order. The same can be said for
on-the-scene exhortations and encouragement of obstructive conduct, as
well as activity which aids and abets the operation of an "underground
railroad" thus enabling draft eligibles to evade the requirements of the
law.

12 6

Although such disruptive demonstrations may fall within the scope
of the federal laws, it seems both inappropriate and unlikely that arrests
would be made on the basis of these statutes. The interests infringed by
the disturbances are not so much federal, but are primarily the interests
of the local citizens who have a right to go about their business unmolested.
Consequently, the demonstrators should be, and usually have been, dealt
with by local authorities under city and state laws against disorderly
conduct, trespass, and incitement to riot.127 Perhaps the initiation of federal prosecutions would depend upon the degree and frequency of the
interference, the ability of the local authorities to cope with the situation, and
the nature of the organization and leadership behind the demonstrations.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of anti-draft activity is that
which is "pure speech," disassociated from conduct per se, and, it is submitted, protected expression. This would include all public communication
as to the immorality of the war or draft, and even the public advocacy of
"avoidance" of the draft by, for example, applying for conscientious
objector status. In effect this expression seeks to persuade the listener
to adopt a belief and, in the latter case, to act on that belief in a legal
manner. As the Court said in Thomas v. Collins:
[The protection of the first amendment] extends to more than abstract
discussion, unrelated to action ....
"Free trade in ideas" means free
trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe
facts. . . Indeed, the whole history of the problem shows it is to
the end of preventing action that repression is primarily directed
and to preserving the right to urge it that the protections are given. 128
125. As indicated earlier, such conduct would be indictable under either the
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1964) or under the Military Training and
Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964).
126. To the Government, the most valuable parts of the statutes with regard to
prosecution of tightly organized draft-resistance groups involved in illegal activity
are their conspiracy provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(b) (1964) and 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 462(a) (1964).
127. For an examination of the recent Supreme Court decisions covering the
regulation of demonstrations by states and cities, see Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L. Rgv. 1773 (1967).
128. 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); accord, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429
(1963).
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These protections may be best maintained by requiring the likelihood that
an imminent substantial danger would directly result from an expression
before such an expression can be punished. In other words, it is necessary that the expression amount to an incitement of illegal action, notwithstanding its "bad tendency."
First amendment problems arise when the protest activity is confined to peaceful demonstrations such as picketing. In such cases the
activity combines the elements of conduct and expression of ideas. Perhaps whether such activity is regulable conduct or is to be respected as
free expression depends on which element predominates, expression or
conduct. While the presence of a handful of picketers marching silently
in front of an induction center presents no substantial danger to the
draft system as a whole, it is possible that a potential registrant or inductee
may be persuaded not to enter the building after reading the picketers'
placards or a pamphlet that they have handed to him. Here, the only
interest that could possibly be involved is federal, not local. There is no
activity that would traditionally involve the use of city or state laws
aimed at preserving public order. Rather, there is a collision between
a form of expression and the will of Congress to punish those who attempt to persuade others not to comply with the law. Picketing and parading is a legitimate form of public expression of opinion and is protected by
the first amendment. 129 Suppression under the draft law or the Espionage
Act would necessarily entail a restriction on the substance of the expression and not just its form. Thus, the "clear and present danger" test
necessitates the finding of an incitement to illegal action before the expression would fall outside the bounds of free speech and into the area
properly proscribed by the statutes. It would seem that picketing and
leafleting of induction centers would lose its protection as free speech
only where an attempt is made to primarily and directly persuade those
subject to the draft to violate the law. Thus, protest which urges others
to seek legal alternatives to the draft or intends primarily to give public
form to dissent would fall short of inciting to unlawful conduct.
The most difficult area in which to draw the line between protected
and nonprotected speech is where the speaker advocates unlawful action,
that is, where evasion or resistance to the draft by illegal means is urged.
As it was demonstrated earlier, 130 and is clearly underscored in Yates v.
United States,181 even advocacy of unlawful action is protected speech
so long as it does not incite unlawful conduct. Short of this, advocacy of
the principle of noncompliance with a law is a primary means of arousing
opposition to that law and of calling the attention of the people and their
representatives in the legislature to the alleged immorality or injustices
of the law. 1m
129. Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, supra note 127, at 1773-74.
130. See p. 360-62 supra.
131. 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
132. In his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 517 (1950),
Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that even advocacy of forceful overthrow of the
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Where one individual has urged another individual to evade the
draft, the Government has invoked the Military Training and Service
Act provision against "counseling" evasion. 133 However, in these cases
the courts have not defined the word "counsels," and it is nowhere defined
in the statute. 134 Judge Learned Hand probably best articulated the common meaning of the word in one of the earliest Espionage Act cases
where he said that, "[t]o counsel or advise a man to an act is to
urge upon him either that it is his interest or his duty to do it.' u3 5

This

definition seems to fit the utterances deemed violative in the cases,
and if the circumstances are such that the counselee is urged to act or
not to act "now," the result being a violation of the law, the facts would
seem to meet the incitement test.
Perhaps the most critical type of advocacy of disobedience of the
draft law, and that which receives the most publicity, is the vociferous
anti-draft speech made before a gathering of draft-eligible young men. 13 6
It might be argued that under certain circumstances such words amount
to counseling refusal to comply with the draft within the meaning of the
Universal Training Act.'8 7 Perhaps this would be true if it were shown
that the statements directly urged breaking of the law, that they were
specifically aimed at a group of people presented with the immediate opportunity to break the law, that the speaker primarily intended in the
course of his talk to instigate law breaking, and that it was probable
that the words would be so acted upon. Absent one of these elements, the
speech would either not lose its mantle of protection, or would not
satisfy a requirement of the Act.
The question that remains is whether such an anti-draft speech
may be punishable as a wilfull obstruction of the draft system under the
Espionage Act. Assuming that the audience is strenuously urged to tell
the draft board "Hell, no, we ain't going" and to go to jail instead of
to war, the problem is, in terms of the incitement requirement, that this
necessarily is advocacy of future action. The listener may be persuaded
to refuse to go when he is called to service, or refuse to register when
he becomes 18 years old, but he can not, as soon as the speech ends, run
out into the street and "evade the draft." Certainly, where the audience
Government should be protected as far as possible in order to preserve any valid
criticism of our society that such commentary may contain. Id. at 549. He further
argued that, "[sluppressing advocates of overthrow inevitably will also silence critics
who do not advocate overthrow but fear that their criticism may be so construed:"
133. See p. 351 upra.
134. See cases cited note 33 supra. One possible reason for this failure to define
"counsels" in the cases may be that in Gara and in Warren, the violation, and therefore the "counseling," was admitted by the defendants.
135. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); see
p. 348 supra.
136. For example, in April 1967, Stokely Carmichael spoke at predominately Negro
Tougaloo College in Jackson, Mississippi. In parts of his speech he attacked the war
and the draft, causing his audience of 600 to 700 students to shout "Hell, no, we won't
go !" for a full 10 minutes. N.Y. Times, April 16, 1967, § 4, at 3, col. 3. See also id.
May 1, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
137. See note 42 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
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is large and made up of persons subject to the draft, the danger that this
type of speech presents to the draft system is greater than that presented
by individual counseling. Where the speaker intends to persuade a large
audience of receptive persons to violate the draft law, and intends thereby
to "obstruct" or "interfere" with selective service processes, the first
amendment requirement that the immediacy of the evil be present is
put to the acid test. It could be argued, using the words of Chief Justice
Vinson in the Dennis case, that, "[ilf the ingredients of the reaction are
present [that is, speaker's unlawful intent; words of incitement; listeners
liable to the draft] we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst
[that is, the opportunity for the listener to violate the law] is added."' 18
But if there is a necessary time-lag between the occasion of the words
of incitement and the occasion for taking the illegal action stimulated
by those words, the proper remedy is not punishment of the speaker, but
"to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education. .

.

. Such .. .is the command of the

Constitution."'' 9 Dennis and Yates allowed advocacy of future illegal
action by words of incitement to be proscribed only after the Court was
satisfied that an action-bent group existed, and that it was of sufficient
size and cohesiveness "to justify the apprehension that action will occur.' 40
Thus, if the speaker and audience are members of a group which does
not operate in the overt political arena, the "marketplace of ideas," no
amount of discussion and education could work to avert the unlawful
action. But absent this element, the danger created by the words at the
time of utterance does not seem to be so great or so imminent as to justify
the abandonment of the commitment of democracy embodied in the first
amendment.

V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As noted previously, the early Espionage Act cases gave little weight
to the protections of the first amendment. While the convictions in the
lower courts were obtained during a time of national crisis and war, the
same convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court years after these
circumstances had abated. During World War II the Supreme Court
reviewed only two draft interference cases, 141 but these cases indicated
that greater respect would be afforded expression and that the first amendment required that restrictions thereon be tested by the "clear and present
danger" test. However, the lower courts, in cases brought under both
the Espionage Act and the Selective Service Act since 1940, did not apply
138. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1950).
139. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion of
Brandeis, J.).
140. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 321 (1957).
141. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944) ; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319
U.S. 583by Villanova
(1943). University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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the "danger" test in fact, but rather based their convictions for interference with the draft by words on a finding that the "natural and probable
effect" of such words could result in draft law violations.
Since 1950, prosecutions for obstructing the draft or counseling
evasion of it have been somewhat rare, and the "clear and present danger"
test has lead an uncertain life in the Supreme Court. The Court has
refused to apply it in cases involving the Communist Party and has
turned to the "balancing" test in other areas. However, it is submitted
that, excepting only the Communist cases, the "balancing" test has not yet
been applied where criminal sanctions fall directly on speech. In those
cases where sanctions fall directly on speech, which would include any
brought under the federal statutes for obstructing or counseling evasion
of the draft, the first amendment requires that the statute meet the strictest
test to be valid, and this is the "clear and present danger" test as viewed
in the context of today's broad first amendment ideals.
The recent Supreme Court cases that apply the "clear and present
danger" test continue to stress the requirement of imminency of a serious
harm before speech in its "pristine form" may be restricted or punished.
In recent cases in other "free speech" areas, the Court, while not expressly
mentioning the "danger" test, emphasizes that even advocacy of unlawful
conduct must amount to an incitement before it can be proscribed. Certainly any "tendency" or "probable effect" test is inconsistent with such
protection. Thus, the key to the "clear and present danger" doctrine lies
in the application of the concept of incitement whereby it can be determined whether the expression is so close to the illegal conduct it seeks
to provoke that the expression itself may be punished.
There can be little doubt that the federal government is closely
watching the anti-war, anti-draft movements which are becoming more
committed to the policy of civil disobedience. The federal prosecutor,
the Department of Justice, has the duty of prosecuting those who interfere with the draft under the Espionage Act and the Universal Military
Training Act. In fulfilling this duty the Department necessarily has a
large amount of discretion in deciding under what circumstances it will
seek to enforce the laws through the courts. But in times of national
stress, when the conflict of ideas becomes sharp, intolerance grows and the
majority puts pressure on the federal government to exercise its discretion and silence an unpopular or disquieting minority.1 42 The executive
agencies vow not only to enforce the laws, but also to uphold the Constitution and therefore to take into account the first amendment rights of the
individual as well as the welfare of society. Against the pressures to minimize constitutional considerations must stand resolute adherence to ob142. In May of 1967, the House Armed
Attorney General Fred M. Vinson before it
Justice Department prosecute those who urged
sentative stated that the public was inundating
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/8
take action against draft evaders and protesters.

Services Committee called Assistant
and reportedly "demanded" that the
defiance of the draft law. One repreCongress with mail demanding that it
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
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jective, judicious, even courageous prosecutorial policies, 143 for it is
certainly the prosecutor who can best and most immediately put into practice the theory underlying our Constitution.
Although some of the recent protest activity is most probably violative of federal law, federal action against such activity is proper only when
it presents a high degree of danger to the administration and efficacy of
the system. In other words, federal prosecution should be withheld, even
where the speech or conduct is illegal, so long as that speech or conduct
remains inconsequential 144 and may be handled adequately by local
authorities. The initiation of federal prosecutions would have a deterrent
effect on the protests in general. In light of the legitimate, critical function
of protest, the prosecutorial discretion should be exercised only where the
damage that could result to the system justifies the loss of the benefits to
be derived from dissenting activity.
Frederick C. Moss
143. At the Congressional hearing, note 142 supra, one representative exclaimed,

"Let's forget the First Amendment." To this Mr. Vinson replied, "I am a firm
believer in the First Amendment." He further testified: "A great deal of the Constitution is intended to protect minorities and dissenters," and that "[alny law that deals
with utterances must be read in the light of the First Amendment."
When asked what can be done against those who dissent and urge disobedience
of the draft, Mr. Vinson replied: "We can all applaud the 99 per cent of our citizens
who vigorously support their country." Id. at 6, col. 4.
144. For an eloquent plea that individual counseling of evasion cases such as
Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947
(1950), should not be prosecuted, see M. KoNVTZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A
FREE PEOPLE 397-99 (1957).
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